Are railways safer after Paddington?

At 8am on October 5 last year commuters on the 6.03am Cheltenham to Paddington train would have been preparing for the day ahead as their train neared its destination. They'd have been closing briefcases, rolling up newspapers, perhaps putting their jackets on ready to face the crush at Paddington.

Just over ten minutes later, many of them were dead.

At Ladbroke Grove, two miles from Paddington, the Great Western express ran head-on into the local 8.06 Thames Trains service from Paddington to Bedwyn in Wiltshire.

The two trains collided with 'incredible force', an inquiry into the disaster opened earlier this year heard. Survivors described the screeching of brakes and violent juddering as the Great Western train came to a halt. One recalled the sound of the impact as being 'between an explosion and thunder'. Others spoke of a fireball shooting along the outside of the carriages while the train was still in motion, and the deathly silence that fell when it finally came to a halt.

In the Great Western train's coach A, senior conductor Colin Paton was later to describe seeing 'people draped over seats, passengers cut and passengers lying on the floor.'

To horrified onlookers, the collision must have been almost as terrifying. One eyewitness spoke of seeing 'bits of train flying through the air, higher than the overhead power cables.'

Altogether, 31 people died and more than 400 were injured in an accident that sent shockwaves through the nation.

In the immediate aftermath, as rescuers struggled to free passengers from the scorched and twisted wreckage and the desperate search went on for passengers still believed to be missing, a horrified nation's thoughts were all for the dead and injured.

But then, inevitably, the mood began to change. Questions began to be asked. How could such a thing have been allowed to happen? And what guarantees were there it would never happen again?

Inevitably, anger focused on the rail companies and their safety record. Some railway staff were abused, spat at and even attacked. More understandably, accusations flew about rail chiefs putting profit before passenger safety. They responded by accusing the media and the public of hysteria.

That was a year ago. Tempers died down and, with the passage of time, many ordinary people forgot about their outrage. But with the anniversary of the tragedy almost upon us, campaigners and those representing the families of those killed and injured will be keen to expose what they see as the lack of progress on improving rail safety.

The inquiry into the Paddington disaster is still ongoing: but it seems likely that what happened was that the Thames Train passed a red signal before colliding with the London-bound Great Western express.

Trains passing signals on red, it soon transpired, was (and remains) far from being the rare occurrence many might have thought. In the past year for which figures are available - up to March this year - a train passed a red light somewhere in the UK no fewer than 568 times. That's getting on for twice every day. A signal just outside York Railway Station was included on a list of signal 'flashpoints' published in the wake of the disaster - leading to fears over the safety of rail services in and out of York.

A year on from Paddington, much of the debate will focus on what technology should be used to try to ensure such a tragedy cannot happen again - and in particular on which of two 'train protection' systems should be used to automatically stop trains which are heading for a red light.

Many campaigners want a state-of-the-art computerised system known as ATP (Automatic Train Protection) which they say could reduce cases of trains passing red lights almost to zero. But Transport Secretary John Prescott appears to have accepted Railtrack arguments that such a system is not ready yet - and that in the interim a cheaper system (TPWS, the Train Warning Protection System) which employs sensors in the tracks to automatically slow trains should be implemented.

But is TPWS really good enough: and if we go down that route will it mean we never get the more advanced system? Railtrack's regional director Nicholas Pollard admits that TPWS is not as effective as the more advanced system: but it will be much quicker to implement, and will serve as a useful interim until the more advanced system can be developed.

"The ATP system is not available today, it is still in development. There is no single system across Europe and the stuff on the continent that does work is not compatible with the UK.

"There is a lower-tech solution (TPWS) which is a lot better than doing nothing and which will deal with the majority of train movements."

TPWS, says Mr Pollard, will be able to stop all trains travelling at 75mph or less within a 'safety zone' beyond a red light. Trains going faster than that will not be stopped within the zone: though their speed will be greatly reduced.

"Even with the fast ones, you will have a reduction in speed to a few miles an hour. We're not talking about 140mph head-on collisions, but much lower speeds."

The great advantage of TPWS, says Mr Pollard, is that it can be installed soon. Rail bosses were already recommending its implementation before Paddington: as a result of that, the date for completing installation of the system at all signals throughout the UK has been brought forward from December 2003 to December 2002. Under present plans, it should be installed at York's 'flashpoint' signal by the end of this financial year.

Mr Pollard, though, insists TWPS is not intended to replace ATP: it is simply an interim measure.

Installation of ATP is starting already on the West Coast Main Line. Work is expected to begin on the East Coast Main Line and other high-speed lines from 2006. Other routes may be considered in future.

Like other rail bosses, Mr Pollard is touchy about accusations that not enough has been done to improve rail safety in the year since Paddington.

The tragedy had been 'devastating', he said: and had 'galvanised' everyone in the industry.

Improved driver training, new electronic signals and 'countdown' signals to give drivers advance warning at flashpoint signals and other measures had already helped bring down the number of cases of trains passing red lights by 12 per cent, to 568 in the last year. TWPS would improve that statistic.

The effect of reducing the number of trains running red signals is clear. The number of collisions and derailments was down last year and, despite Paddington, the number of passengers killed dropped from 39 the previous year to 33 last year. Total deaths on the railways, including suicides, deaths at stations and people playing on lines, stood at 266.

That, of course, is still 266 too many. Despite TWPS, if there were to be another disaster on the scale of Paddington, the clamour for ATP to be introduced immediately may become deafening.