AN AMERICAN general apparently remarked during the Korean War that he liked having British troops in his rearguard because they were a steadying influence.

Steadiness is certainly required for rearguard duties, as it’s generally unnerving to think you might be the last troops left holding off the enemy while your mates are heading in another direction.

I wonder if British troops feel a bit like they’re involved in a rearguard action in Afghanistan right now – not because the rest of the foreign forces there are beating retreat, but because dates have been set for their departure. And while creating a timetable for withdrawal may be what western electorates demand of their politicians, it creates all sorts of trouble for troops on the ground, as some military leaders told President Obama when he started this particular ball rolling.

In particular, it clearly gave a tremendous incentive to the Taliban to step up its campaign against western troops, whether to build momentum for an armed takeover when the foreigners leave or to gain advantage in possible future negotiations – I’m not privy to Taliban planning, but either strategy would make a degree of sense.

So the news that a bomb had killed six British soldiers, five from the Yorkshire Regiment, was a huge tragedy, and one which made me twinge inwardly in sympathy when I saw the regiment’s recruitment posters afterwards on York’s bus stops.

But, sadly, it’s not a huge surprise, particularly if one casts even a cursory glance at Afghan history.

The first thing that stands out – as I said in an article in 2001 when the US first “went in” – is if you’re going to take military action in Afghanistan you should do so for specific reasons and not hang around. I mention this not to appear personally clever, but rather because it seemed such an obvious conclusion.

But instead of eradicating al Qaida’s presence – which included defeating the Taliban – and getting out, the foreigners stayed. Then, instead of concentrating on speedily bringing peace, order and regeneration to Afghanistan, they became complacent because victory had come easily and things seemed peaceful, and switched their attention to Iraq.

Big mistake. Let’s take another look at history, and the ultimately catastrophic British invasion of 1838. The invaders quickly seized control, imposed a new ruler of their own liking and things seemed so peaceful wives and families joined British officers in Kabul.

But in reality the British-backed ruler had little power beyond the capital, resentment against the foreigners grew and Afghans followed their tradition of switching to the “winning side”.

Eventually violence engulfed the British occupiers of Kabul, all but one of whom was killed or taken hostage. The British had little choice but to reinstate the ruler they had ousted, Dost Mohammed.

Though there are disturbing similarities between then and now, the past may hold some hope for a present resolution. What the British learned, in part anyway, was that their interests were best served not by occupying Afghanistan, but by dealing with a relatively strong Afghan ruler. Dost honoured all his treaty obligations, even when the Indian Mutiny gave him a perfect opportunity for revenge.

But where is strong Afghan leadership to be found now? President Karzai hasn’t provided it, and plans to step down anyway. The western legacy to Afghanistan may well be a large and relatively well-trained Afghan army, but who is to command it?

That’s surely the great political question facing everyone involved in this unhappy nation, and may be an incentive for the Taliban to come to the negotiating table – because they may have more to gain there than if Afghanistan is again torn between rival warlords.

In the meantime British servicemen and women are facing an increasingly angry population, and the prospect of yet more savage reprisals following the apparent slaughter of 16 Afghan civilians, women and children among them, by a “rogue” US soldier.

They will need all the steadiness and support from home they can get.